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Introduction
Since the seminal work of Ramsey (1928) , optimal growth models have played a central role in modern macroeconomics. Classical growth theory relies on the assumption that labor is supplied in fixed amounts, although the original paper of Ramsey did include the disutility of labor as an argument in consumers' utility functions. Subsequent research in applied macroeconomics (theories of business cycle fluctuations) has reassessed the role of the labor-leisure choice in the process of growth. Nowadays, intertemporal models with elastic labor continue to be the standard setting used to model many issues in applied macroeconomics.
Our purpose is to prove existence of competitive equilibrium for the basic neoclassical model with elastic labor with less stringent assumptions than in the literature using some recent results (see Le Van and Saglam (2004) ) concerning the existence of Lagrange multipliers in infinite dimensional spaces and their representation as a summable sequence.
Lagrange multiplier techniques have facilitated considerably the analysis of constrained optimization problems. The application of these techniques in the analysis of intertemporal models inherits most of the tractability found in a finite setting. However, the passage to an infinite dimensional setting raises additional questions. These questions concern both the extension of the Lagrangean in an infinite dimensional setting as well as the representation of the Lagrange multipliers as a summable sequence.
Previous work addressing existence of competitive equilibrium in intertemporal models attacks the problem of existence from an abstract point of view. Following the early work of Peleg and Yaari (1970) , this approach is based on separation arguments applied to arbitrary vector spaces (see Bewley (1972) , Bewley (1982) , Aliprantis, et al. (1990) , Dana and Le Van (1991) ). The advantage of this approach is that it yields general results capable of application in a wide variety of models. However, it requires a high level of abstraction and some strong assumptions.
Le Van and Vailakis (2004) in order to prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in a model with a representative agent and elastic labor supply impose relatively strong assumptions. 1 In this paper, the existence of equilibrium cannot be established by using marginal utilities since we may have boundary solutions.
Recently, Le Van, et al. (2007) extended the canonical representative agent Ramsey model to include heterogeneous agents and elastic labor supply and supermodularity is used to establish the convergence of optimal paths. The novelty in their work is that relatively impatient consumers have their consumption and leisure converging to zero and any Pareto optimal capital path converges to a limit point as time tends towards infinity. However, if the limit points of the Pareto optimal capital paths are not bounded away from zero, then their convergence results do not ensure existence of equilibrium.
To obtain the convergence results, they impose strong assumptions which are not used in our paper. 2 Following the Negishi approach (1960), our strategy for tackling the question of existence relies on exploiting the link between for the proof of kt > 0 for all t.
2 Le Van, et al. (2007) assume that the cross-partial derivative u i cl has constant sign, u i c (x, x) and u i l (x, x) are non-increasing in x, the production function F is homogenous of degree α ≤ 1 and F kL ≥ 0 (Assumptions U4, F4, U5, F5).
Pareto-optima and competitive equilibria. We show that there exist Lagrange multipliers which can be used as a price system such that together with the Pareto-optimal solution they constitute an equilibrium with transfers. These transfers depend on the individual weights involved in the social welfare function. An equilibrium exists provided that there is a set of welfare weights such that the corresponding transfers equal zero. The model in which we establish existence is with complete contingent commodity Arrow-Debreu markets (as opposed to trading in sequential markets) and the prices and transfers are sufficient for decentralizing the optimal allocation. We also do not require, with additional assumptions, as in Le Van, et al. (2007) that the optimal capital stock converges in the long run to a strictly positive value in order to get prices in 1 + . The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the model and provide sufficient conditions on the objective function and the constraint functions so that Lagrange multipliers can be presented by an 1 + sequence. We characterize some dynamic properties of the Pareto optimal paths of capital and of consumption-leisure. In particular, we prove that the optimal consumption and leisure paths of the more impatient agents will converge to zero in the long run (see Becker (1980) for a similar result in a sequential trading model) with a very elementary proof compared to the one in Le Van, et al. (2007) which uses supermodularity for lattice programming. In section 3, we prove the existence of competitive equilibrium by using the Negishi approach and the inward boundary fixed point theorem.
The model
We consider an intertemporal model with m ≥ 1 consumers and one firm. There is a single produced good in each period that is either consumed or invested as capital. The preferences of each consumer, i = 1, . . . , m, take the additive form:
is the discount factor. At date t, consumer i consumes c i t of the good, enjoys a quantity of leisure l i t and supplies a quantity of labor L i t which are normalized so that l i t +L i t = 1. Production possibilities are given by the gross production function F and a physical depreciation δ ∈ (0, 1).
. We next specify a set of restrictions on preferences and the production technology. 3 U1: u i is continuous, concave, increasing on R + ×[0, 1] and strictly increasing, strictly concave on R ++ × (0, 1).
U2: u i (0, 0) = 0. 3 We relax some important assumptions in the literature. For example, Bewley (1972) assumes that the production set is a convex cone (Theorem 3, page 525). Bewley (1982) assumes the strict positiveness of derivatives of utility functions on R L + (strict monotonicity assumption, page 240).
U3: u i is twice continuously differentiable on R ++ × (0, 1) with partial derivatives satisfying the Inada conditions: lim c→0 u i c (c, l) = +∞, ∀l ∈ (0, 1] and lim l→0 u i l (c, l) = +∞, ∀c > 0. We extend the utility functions on
The assumptions on the production function F : R 2 + → R + are as follows: F1: F is continuous, concave, increasing on R 2 + and strictly increasing, strictly concave on R 2 ++ . F2: F (0, 0) = 0.
F3: F is twice continuously differentiable on R 2 ++ with partial derivatives satisfying the Inada conditions:
we say it is feasible from k 0 and we denote the class of feasible capital paths by Π
The set of feasible consumption-leisure sequences from k 0 is denoted by (k 0 ). Assumption F3 implies that
It follows that there exists k > 0 such that:
We now give the characterization of the competitive equilibrium. For each consumer i, let α i > 0 denote the share of the profit of the firm which is owned by consumer i. We have m i=1 α i = 1. Let ϑ i > 0 be the share of the initial endowment owned by consumer i. Clearly, m i=1 ϑ i = 1, and ϑ i k 0 is the endowment of consumer i.
Definition 1 Let k 0 > 0. A competitive equilibrium for this model consists of a sequence of prices p * = (p * t ) ∞ t=0 for the consumption good, a wage sequence w * = (w * t ) ∞ t=0 for labor, a price r for the initial capital stock k 0 and an allocation
where π * is the maximum profit of the single firm. iii) (k * , L * ) is a solution to the firm's problem
Observe that we have for any i
In other words, in equilibrium, every agent is individually rational. We will therefore study the individually rational Pareto optimum problem (or Pareto problem, in short). We show that the Lagrange multipliers are in 1 + . Then these multipliers will be used to define a price and wage system for the equilibrium.
Let ∆ = {η 1 , η 2 , . . . , η m |η i ≥ 0 and m i=1 η i = 1}. Given a vector of welfare weights η ∈ ∆, define the Pareto problem
and the individual rationality constraints:
is increasing and bounded and will converge. Thus, we can write
where:
The following theorem follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in Le Van and Saglam (2004) (see also Dechert (1982) ).
Suppose that two following assumptions are satisfied:
Let x * be a solution to (P) and x ∈ C satisfy the Strong Slater condition:
and ΛΦ(x * ) = 0.
Obviously, for any η ∈ ∆, an optimal path will depend on η. In what follows, if possible, we will suppress η and denote by (c * i , k * , L * i , l * i ) any optimal path for each agent i. The following proposition characterizes the Lagrange multipliers of the Pareto problem. 
Proof : We show that the Strong Slater condition holds. Since f k (0, m) > 1, 5 for all k 0 > 0, there exists some k ∈ (0, k 0 ) such that: 0 < k < f ( k, m) and 0 < k < f (k 0 , m). Thus, there exists a small positive number ε such that: and k = (k 0 , k, k, . . .). We have
For a concave function f defined on R n , ∂f (x) denotes the subdifferential of f at x. 5 Assumption f k (0, 1) > 1 is equivalent to the Adequacy Assumption in Bewley (1972) , see Le Van and Dana (2003) Remark 6.1.1. This assumption is crucial to have equilibrium prices in 1 + since it implies that the production set has an interior point. Subsequently, one can use a separation theorem in the infinite dimensional space to derive Lagrange multipliers.
To show that Φ i −1 (x) < 0, for any i, we just observe that the Inada condition lim c→0 u i c (c, l) = +∞ implies u i ( ε m , 1 − ε m ) > u i (0, 1) if ε is small enough. Therefore, the Strong Slater condition is satisfied.
It is obvious that, ∀T ,
As in Le Van and Saglam (2004) , Assumption T2 is satisfied. We now check Assumption T1.
For any
As
where u(A, 1) = max{u i (A, 1), i = 1, . . . , m}. Hence, F(x T ( x, x)) → F( x) when T → ∞. Taking account of the Theorem 1, we get (1)- (6) . Obviously, ∩ m i=1 ri(dom(u i )) = ∅ where ri(dom(u i )) is the relative interior of dom(u i ). It follows from the Proposition 6.5.5 in Florenzano and Le Van (2001) , we have
We then get (8)-(10) as the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions. Remark 1 1. We can prove that η i = 0 ⇒ c * i t = 0, l * i t = 1, ∀t. Indeed, since the u i are increasing, we have c * i t = 0, for any t. The individual rationality constraint implies l * i t = 1 for any t. The Inada condition on u i , from (8), implies λ i −1 = 0. Hence, 1) . Therefore, there exists i with η i > 0 and λ i −1 = 0.
4. For any k 0 > 0, there exists t with i c * i t > 0 and hence i l * i 1) : contradiction with the first statement.)
In the following proposition, we will prove the positiveness of the optimal capital path.
Proposition 2 If k 0 > 0, the optimal capital path satisfies k * t > 0, ∀t.
Proof : Let k 0 > 0 but assume that k * 1 = 0. From (10), L * 1 = 0. This implies i c * i 1 = 0 and l * i 1 = 1, ∀i: a contradiction with (8) . Hence k * 1 > 0. By induction, k * t > 0, ∀t > 0.
Remark 2 From (10) and Proposition 2, if k 0 > 0, we have L * t > 0 for any t ≥ 0. Hence, for any t ≥ 0,
(a) With any η ∈ ∆, there exists a unique solution to the Pareto problem (c * i ), (l * i ), k * . We have: For any t ≥ 0,
and for any i,
and if there exist λ 1 ∈ 1 + , (λ i −1 ) ∈ R m + which satisfy (11), (12) and (13), then c * i , l * i , k * solve the Pareto problem with weights η and λ 1 is an associated multiplier.
Proof : It is easy.
Proposition 4 Let k 0 > 0. Then there exists a unique multiplier λ 1 ∈ 1 .
Proof : Existence has been proven. Let us prove uniqueness. First observe that, from Remark 2, we have
We have three cases.
1. If for any t, i c * i t > 0, then λ 1 t (η) = η j β t j u j (c * j t , l * j t ) with c * j t > 0 and λ j −1 = 0 (see statement 1 of Remark 1).
2. Since k 0 > 0 there exists t with i c * i t > 0.
(a) When i c * i 0 > 0, let T be the first date where i c * i T = 0 (and hence i l * i T = 0). From t = 0 to t = T − 1, λ 1 t (η) is uniquely determined. We have, from (13),
T +1 (η) is uniquely determined. By induction, the result holds for every t.
is uniquely determined. By backward induction λ 1 t (η) is uniquely determined from 0 to T −1. We also have λ 1 T +1 (η)f k (k * T +1 , L * T +1 ) = λ 1 T (η) and λ 1 T +1 (η) is uniquely determined. By forward induction, the result holds for every t ≥ T + 1.
Let us denote I = {i |η i > 0}, β = max{β i |i ∈ I}, I 1 = {i ∈ I | β i = β} and I 2 = {i ∈ I | β i < β}. We now show that the consumption and leisure paths of all agents with a discount factor less than the maximum one converge to zero. The proof is very simple compared to the one in Le Van, et al. (2007) which uses the supermodular structure inspired by lattice programming.
Proposition 5 If (k * , c * i , l * i ) denotes the optimal path starting from k 0 , then ∀i ∈ I 2 , c * i t −→ 0 and l * i t −→ 0.
Proof : First observe that any Individually Rational Pareto Optimum ((c * , l * , k * )) is also a Pareto Optimum without the Individually Rationality Constraint. That means there exists η ∈ ∆ such that ((c * , l * , k * )) solve
For this problem, one can show that η i = 0 implies that the sequences of optimal consumptions and leisures equal to 0.
It is easy to see that the Pareto problem is equivalent to
(1 − l i t ) + (1 − δ)k t .
Denote Z t = η i ( βi β ) t . From the Berge Maximum Theorem (1959), the strict concavity and the increasingness of the utility functions, the optimal c * i , l * i are continuous with respect to (Z t , k t , k t+1 ). Denote these functions by Γ i (Z t , k * t , k * t+1 ), Λ i (Z t , k * t , k * t+1 ) i . Let κ * , ξ * denote the limit points of k * t , k * t+1 when t → +∞. Then, for i ∈ I 2 , Γ i (Z t , k * t , k * t+1 ) converges to Γ i (0 I2 , (η i ) i∈I2 , κ * , ξ * ) = 0, and Λ i (Z t , k * t , k * t+1 ) converges to Λ i (0 I2 , (η i ) i∈I2 , κ * , ξ * ) = 0.
Existence of competitive equilibrium
We have proved that there exist Lagrange multipliers (λ i −1 ) i , λ(η) , with (λ i −1 ) i ∈ R m + and λ(η) = (λ 1 (η), λ 2i (η), λ 3 (η), λ 4i (η), λ 5i (η))
L * i t , l * i t = 1 − L * i t and k * 0 = k 0 .
The differences between two definitions -competitive equilibrium and price equilibrium with transfers -are the budget constraints of consumers. If the transfers φ i (η) = 0 for all i, a price equilibrium with transfers is a competitive equilibrium.
Before proving existence of an equilibrium, we will first prove that any solution to the Pareto problem, x * = (c * i , k * , l * i ), associated with k 0 > 0 and η ∈ ∆ is an equilibrium with transfers, with some appropriate prices (p * t ) ∈ 1 + \ {0} and wages (w * t ) ∈ 1 + \ {0}. The following result is required.
